United States Supreme Court Summaries

RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS

District of Columbia, et al v Deck Anthony Heller
___ US ___; ___ SCt ___; ___ LEd2d ___
83 CrL 565; (#07-290, 06-26-08)

Affirmed judgment of D.C. Court of Appeals enjoining the District of Columbia from enforcing a law providing that residents are required to keep lawfully owned firearms unloaded and dissembled or bound by a trigger lock.

The Second Amendment protects the individual right to have and use weapons for self-defense, and the District of Columbia’s ban on handguns in the home violates that right. The Amendment guarantees the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation. Reading the Second Amendment as protecting only the right to “keep and bear Arms” in an organized militia “fits poorly with the operative clause's description of the holder of that right as ‘the people.’” Like most rights, the right to bear arms is not limited, and restrictions on carrying concealed weapons, possession of a firearm by felons, or carrying dangerous or unusual weapons, are not unconstitutional.

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DEATH PENALTY

Patrick Kennedy v Louisiana
___ US ___; ___ SCt ___; ___ LEd2d ___
83 CrL 530; (#07-343, 06-25-08)

Reversed judgment of Louisiana Supreme Court upholding conviction of child rape and death sentence.

A death sentence for one who raped but did not kill a child, and who did not intend to assist another in killing the child, is unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. As it relates to crimes against individuals, the death penalty should not be expanded to instances where the victim's life was not taken. There is a national consensus against capital punishment for the crime of child rape, which may be devastating in harm but cannot be compared to murder in terms of “severity and irrevocability.” Moreover, there are many reasons why allowing capital punishment in cases of child rape would only compound the harm to the victim.

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CONFRONTATION--Right To

Dwayne Giles v California
___ US ___; ___ SCt ___; ___ LEd2d ___
83 CrL 549; #07-6053, 06-25-08)

Reversed judgment of California Supreme Court affirming conviction of domestic violence.

The forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception to the right of confrontation does not allow prosecutors to present testimonial hearsay in the absence of a showing that, at the time the accused engaged in the wrongful acts that rendered the declarant unavailable, the accused was acting with an intent to prevent the declarant from testifying. The manner in which the rule was applied in early cases makes plain that unconfronted testimony would not be admitted without a showing that the defendant intended to prevent a witness from testifying. Where defendants killed their victims for reasons unrelated to the victims later testifying in court, the victims’ statements were not admitted unless they fell within the hearsay exception for dying declarations.

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SENTENCING AND PUNISHMENT--Resentencing
APPEALS--Scope Of

Michael Greenlaw v United States
___ US ___; ___ SCt ___; ___ LEd2d ___
83 CrL 478; (#07-330, 06-23-08)

Vacated judgment of Court of Appeals ordering district court to increase defendant's sentence by 15 years.

Absent a government appeal or cross-appeal, the Court of Appeals cannot, on its own initiative, order an increase in a defendant's sentence to correct a district court's mistake. The courts are to rely on the parties to frame the issues, acting solely as neutral arbiters. Also, the cross-appeal rule precludes an appellate court from altering a judgment to benefit a non-appealing party. Even if there are some circumstances where it might be proper for an appellate court to initiate plain-error review, a sentencing error that the government refrained from pursuing does not present such a circumstance.

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COUNSEL--Right To

Walter A. Rothgery v Gillespie County
___ US ___; ___ SCt ___; ___ LEd2d ___
83 CrL 487; (#07-440, 06-23-08)

Reversed judgment of Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirming district court order granting summary judgment to respondent.

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is triggered by the arrestee's initial appearance before a judicial officer at which he is formally apprised of the accusations against him and restraints are placed on his freedom, regardless of whether a prosecutor is aware of the arrest. By the time the defendant is brought before a judicial officer, the state's relationship with the defendant has become “solidly adversarial.” Even if prosecutors are completely unaware of the accusations made by arresting officers, the arrestee at that point requires counsel to begin navigating the complexities of criminal law.

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COUNSEL--Right To

Indiana v Ahmad Edwards
___ US ___; ___ SCt ___; ___ LEd2d ___
83 CrL 470; (#07-208, 06-19-08)

Vacated judgment of Indiana Supreme Court affirming opinion of intermediate court of appeals granting a new trial.

The Sixth Amendment does not forbid states from forcing a defendant to proceed with counsel where the accused has been found to be competent to stand trial but is deemed incompetent to represent himself. Mental illness can vary in degree and can interfere with a defendant's functioning at different times in different ways. A right of self-representation at trial will not “affirm the dignity” of a defendant who lacks the mental capacity to conduct his defense without the assistance of counsel.

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HABEAS CORPUS--Federal

Lakhdar Boumediene, et al v George W. Bush
Khaled A.F. Al Odah v United States
___ US ___; ___ SCt ___; ___ LEd2d ___
83 CrL 392; (#06-1195; 06-1196, 06-12-08)

Reversed judgment of D.C. Court of Appeals finding that federal court lacked jurisdiction to consider habeas application.

Aliens detained as enemy combatants at the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay enjoy the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus. Congress's decision to block the federal courts from considering the detainees' habeas petitions without affording them any adequate substitute violated the Constitution's suspension clause. The procedural protections afforded alien detainees before military Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) fall well short of those that would eliminate the need for habeas review. The government offered no credible arguments that the military mission at Guantanamo would be compromised if habeas corpus courts had jurisdiction to hear the detainees claims.

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HABEAS CORPUS--Federal

Mohammad Munaf, et al v Pete Green
Pete Green, et al v Sandra K. Omar and Ahmed S. Omar
___ US ___; ___ SCt ___; ___ LEd2d ___
83 CrL 432; (#06-1666; 07-394, 06-12-08)

Vacated judgment of D.C. Court of Appeals affirming district court order dismissing habeas petition for lack of jurisdiction.

The habeas statute extends to American citizens held overseas by American forces operating subject to an American chain of command. The troops' participation in a multinational force did not bar application of habeas jurisdiction. However, the district court abused its discretion in granting preliminary injunctive habeas relief on the basis of the difficulty of the jurisdictional question, without considering the plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits.

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SENTENCING AND PUNISHMENT--Guidelines--Blakely

Richard Irizarry v United States
___ US ___; ___ SCt ___; ___ LEd2d ___
83 CrL 442; (#06-7517, 06-12-08)

Affirmed judgment of Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirming sentence of 60 months in prison.

The federal rule that requires a sentencing judge to give notice to the parties prior to any departure from the sentencing range recommended by the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines does not require judges to give notice prior to exercising their discretion to impose a non-guidelines sentence pursuant to United States v Booker, 543 US 220 (2005). Any expectation that a criminal defendant would receive a sentence within the presumptively applicable guideline range did not survive the decision in Booker. Defendants and prosecutors are already on notice of the considerable leeway that districts judges now enjoy to impose non-guidelines sentences.

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RICO

John Bridge, et al v Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co., et al
___ US ___; ___ SCt ___; ___ LEd2d ___
83 CrL 361; (#07-210, 06-09-08)

Affirmed judgment of Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversing district court order dismissing RICO claims.

A plaintiff asserting a Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) claim predicated on mail fraud need not show that it relied on the defendant's alleged misrepresentations, either as an element of its claim or to show proximate causation of its injury. The language of the RICO Act requires only that the plaintiff be injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of the Act, and the plaintiffs' loss of valuable liens as a result of the alleged fraud satisfied that requirement.

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MONEY LAUNDERING

United States v Efrain Santos and Benedicto Diaz
___ US ___; ___ SCt ___; ___ LEd2d ___
83 CrL 320; (#06-1005, 06-02-08)

Affirmed judgment of Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversing conviction of money laundering.

A four-justice plurality held that revenue that an illicit business uses to pay its operating expenses does not constitute “proceeds” for purposes of the federal money-laundering statute's prohibition against using criminal proceeds to engage in transactions designed to promote the unlawful activity. Only net profits, not gross receipts, can qualify as “proceeds” from an illegal gambling enterprise. Defendants are entitled to the benefit of the rule of lenity because the language of the statute provides just as much reason to think “proceeds” means receipts as to think it means “profits.”

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MONEY LAUNDERING

Humberto Fidel Regalado Cuellar v United States
___ US ___; ___ SCt ___; ___ LEd2d ___
83 CrL 333 (#06-1456, 06-02-08)

Reversed judgment of Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirming conviction of money laundering.

The federal money laundering statute cannot be satisfied solely by evidence that the funds were concealed during transport. Prosecutors must show that the purpose of the transportation of the cash out of the country was to conceal the nature, ownership, or other specified attributes of the tainted cash, not just that one of the attributes was concealed to achieve the transportation. However, the statue does not require the government to prove an attempt to give tainted cash “an appearance of legitimate wealth.”

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